The aim of this translation is to present Hegel's Encyclopedia Logic faithfully in readable and lucid contemporary English prose. The task is daunting, given the technical and dated senses of his terminology, the idiosyncrasies of his style, and – above all – the sheer complexity and power of his thinking. A translation must be sensitive to the fact that Hegel's terminology is now almost two centuries old, stemming from a period when German philosophers – even in the wake of Kant and Herder, Mendelssohn and Wolff – were still looking for the words to express themselves. While Hegel marks a high point in this development, it is also a distant memory today. Moreover, translators of Hegel's Logic must never lose sight of the fact that, while Hegel eschews neologisms for the most part, he nonetheless moulds terms to suit the distinctive technical aims of a philosophical science and, indeed, in the text at hand, the aims of a science of logic that underpins all other philosophical sciences. In addition, like any writer, he has a style all his own that, even in its quirkiness, must be respected and reflected as much as possible in translation. Finally and most importantly, the task of translating Hegel's texts must heed their philosophical import, capturing and conveying to their readers the force of the philosophical arguments that they contain.

Our translation of Hegel's Encyclopedia Logic has been motivated by the general principles just outlined. We have tried to strike a balance between the need to be faithful to Hegel's prose in its historical context and the desire to convey the force of his thinking as clearly as possible. These general principles guided our endeavour but, as general principles, they left us with several prudential decisions about the translations of specific words and phrases. The results of our decisions about specific terms can be garnered from the Glossary. However, it may prove helpful to review our reasons for translating some traditionally troublesome terms in the ways that we did.

First, however, a word about the editions on which the translation is based. We based the translation on the text of the 1830 edition of Hegel's Encyclopedia as it appears in the reissue by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, published as vol. VIII of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1970). The Moldenhauer–Michel text is based on the Complete Edition of Hegel's works by his students (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832–45). This text also contains the Additions (Zusätze) of the 1840 edition of Hegel's Encyclopedia, which appeared as vol. VI of the Complete Edition. We found that the differences between the latter and the following Akademie edition were largely limited to spelling or orthography: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), unter Mitarbeit von Udo Rameil, herausgegeben von Wolfgang Bonsiepen und Hans-Christian Lucas, in: Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band XX (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992).

We have followed ordinary English usage and left most terms uncapitalized, leaving it to the reader to determine from the context whether or not Hegel is using terms such as 'concept' and 'idea', for example, in the technical senses he gives them in the Logic. On the other hand, in cases where it is helpful to know which term Hegel uses in the original, we often insert the German term in italics and brackets.

Finding a suitable English equivalent for aufheben is perhaps the most formidable challenge for translators of Hegel's texts. We translate the term with 'sublate', 'sublating' or 'sublation'. The alternative 'supersede' would have had the advantage of conveying much of the technical term's central significance as a process of cancellation, preservation, and elevation at once. However, as Hegel's aufheben and Aufhebung are themselves non-ordinary terms of art like 'sublate', and since the translation of the Science of Logic appearing in this series of Hegel translations chose 'sublate' and 'sublation', we thought it best to opt for 'sublate' and 'sublation' as well.

Because Moment is Hegel's technical term for integral but distinguishable parts of a concept or definition, we have decided to translate it as 'moment', despite the obviously different normal sense of the English term.

Hegel characterizes Dasein as 'determinate being' (bestimmtes Sein), but uses Dasein as the name of this category. We have translated Dasein as 'existence', since that is the closest English equivalent. Since Hegel also uses Existenz as a technical term in the Logic of Essence, we chose 'concrete existence' for the latter to mark the difference between Dasein and Existenz.

Similarly, we translate Wesen straightforwardly as 'essence' except for those cases where, in the English context, it clearly refers to a being such as 'the supreme being' (das höchste Wesen).

Since Hegel employs Inhalt far more often than he employs the cognate, but in his use more emphatic, term Gehalt, we have reserved 'content' for Inhalt and translated Gehalt as 'basic content' – unless otherwise indicated, as, for example, in the Foreword and in § 48. In order to differentiate Sache from Ding ('thing') and Materie ('matter'), we have systematically translated Sache as 'basic matter'.

The term wissen – as the adjectives (e.g. 'immediate' or 'absolute') chosen by Hegel to modify it suggest – can signify the entire gamut of knowing, from the most elemental knowledge to knowledge that is absolute. At one point (§ 81, Addition 2) Hegel uses wissen to designate knowing in general, while attributing erkennen to philosophy (see, however, his reference to philosophisches Wissen in § 88). Along these lines, erkennen signifies at times the mediation of a process of wissen, the specification of a more immediate wissen (see § 46: 'Now to know [erkennen] means nothing other than knowing [wissen] an object in terms of its determinate content'), although it is also used as a synonym for or in apposition to wissen (see § 225: 'The former is the drive of knowledge [Wissen] to truth, knowing [Erkennen] as such'). Given the frequent lack of differentiation of the two terms and Hegel's far more frequent use of erkennen than wissen, we have elected to translate both as 'knowing' or 'knowledge'. However, readers can assume that any occurrence of 'immediate knowing' translates das unmittelbare Wissen or unmittelbares Wissen. In any other case where wissen is in play, we indicate as much by citing the relevant German term.

In two other instances where a single English term is the best translation for two German words, we have employed a similar strategy. Thus, we translate both Unterschied and Differenz as 'difference' but flag the less frequent uses of Differenz (and its cognates: different, indifferent and the like).

We follow a modified version of this strategy with respect to Gegenstand and Objekt. Both may be rendered as 'object', but Gegenstand refers typically to any object of consideration or, more technically, to an object of consciousness or experience; Objekt, on the other hand, refers to the logical concept of object and is the title of the second chapter of the third division of the Logic. Before § 193, the final section before that chapter, Hegel employs Gegenstand far more frequently than Objekt, while afterwards he employs Objekt far more frequently than Gegenstand. So, prior to § 193, all unflagged instances of 'object' refer to Gegenstand and we flag all instances of 'object' as a translation of Objekt. After § 193, all unflagged instances of 'object' refer to Objekt and we flag all instances of 'object' as a translation of Gegenstand. Throughout the entire text, an unflagged 'objectivity' is a translation of Objektivität.

Hegel often employs the term scheinen in its ordinary sense as an equivalent to 'seem' and we have translated it accordingly. However, he also employs it in a technical way that draws upon two distinguishable senses of the term, namely, that of 'shining' and '(projecting or presenting a) semblance'. In contexts where this technical employment is clearly intended (in particular, in the Logic of Essence, starting with § 112 and the Logic of the Concept at §§ 240 et seq.), we have employed one of the two translations, depending upon the emphasis more directly germane to the passage in question.

Another vexing word-play in Hegel's text is the phrase sich mit etwas zusammenschließen, here translated as 'joins itself together with something' or, simply, 'joins together with something' (where 'something' is often replaced by a specific term). This translation, while reflecting a common usage of the German expression, does not convey any link with another use of schließen, namely, 'infer' or 'syllogistically infer', precisely in the sense of bringing an inference or syllogism to a 'close'. Thus, whereas schließen can mean 'inferring' or 'closing', zusammenschließen means 'uniting' (in the sense of 'closing ranks'). Unable to find a suitable English expression that preserved the German word-play – 'close' and 'infer (i.e. close an argument)' and 'join together (i.e. close ranks)' – we chose to stay with the straightforward translation and simply acknowledge its inadequateness. Traduttore, traditore!